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A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR 
RELEASE: GRAHAM AND MILLER APPLIED TO 
DE FACTO SENTENCES OF LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
Abstract: Following the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, 
that sentences of life without parole for non-incorrigible offenders who commit-
ted their crimes before the age of eighteen were unconstitutional, state and fed-
eral courts were left confused as to the decision’s parameters. In April 2018, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Grant v. United States, ruled that a term of 
years sentence that exceeded the life expectancy of an offender who committed 
a crime as a juvenile constituted de facto life without parole, and was unconsti-
tutional under Miller. This decision was in accordance with decisions by the 
Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, however, held that Miller only applies to mandatory sentences of 
life without parole. This Comment argues that the Third Circuit better analyzed 
Supreme Court jurisprudence to find that de facto life without parole sentences 
for non-incorrigible juveniles were inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s juris-
prudence. Meanwhile, the Eighth Circuit’s analysis fell short due to that court 
according insufficient weight to Montgomery v. Louisiana. 
INTRODUCTION 
Corey Grant’s story was a tragic, if not atypical one.1 As a young boy, 
he grew up in a troubled household with an inattentive mother and often 
absentee father.2 Being physically imposing even as a youth, Grant joined a 
drug gang in his hometown of Elizabeth, New Jersey.3 After participating in 
a fatal confrontation with rival drug dealers, Grant was sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole, despite being only sixteen-years-old 
at the time.4 Following the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Miller v. Ala-
bama, Grant was able to get his sentence reconsidered, and was resentenced 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant Corey Grant and Appendix Volume 1 of 3 at 5, United 
States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, vacated, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 
2018) (No. 16-3820), 2017 WL 2266122 at *5 [hereinafter Brief of Appellant] (describing Grant’s 
childhood, growing up with a teenage mother who was addicted to drugs, and a father who was 
incarcerated). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See id. at 8, 11 (describing the E-Port Posse and Grant’s usefulness to them). 
 4 Grant, 887 F.3d at 134. 
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such that he will likely be released at age seventy-two.5 He fears that by 
then he will be dead.6 
Miller is the last case in a line of Supreme Court jurisprudence striking 
down the harshest penalties for offenders who committed crimes as juve-
niles.7 The Miller Court held that mandatory sentences of life without pa-
role for juveniles capable of reform are unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment.8 In the years following, federal courts have considered wheth-
er the rule promulgated in Miller applies to lengthy sentences that exceed an 
offender’s life expectancy.9 
In 2018, in United States v. Grant, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled that a sixty-five year long sentence for a non-incorrigible juvenile 
homicide offender was an unconstitutional de facto life without parole sen-
tence under Miller.10 Several other circuit courts have reached similar con-
clusions.11 In Grant, however, the Third Circuit further expounded that, to 
comport with the spirit of the Supreme Court precedents announced in Mil-
ler and in 2010 in Graham v. Florida, there exists a presumption that a ju-
venile must be afforded a chance to obtain release before the age of sixty-
five, which the court determined to be the national retirement age.12 
The Third Circuit in Grant acknowledged that its decision split with 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 2016 decision in United States v. Jef-
ferson.13 In that case, the court refused to overturn a fifty year long sentence 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Id. at 135, 147. 
 6 See id. at 147 (noting that according to Grant, he will be released at the same age as his life 
expectancy). 
 7 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (finding mandatory life without parole 
sentences for juveniles unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment); Sarah French Russell & 
Tracy L. Denholtz, Procedures for Proportionate Sentences: The Next Wave of Eighth Amendment 
Noncapital Litigation, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1121, 1125–31 (2016) (chronicling iterative Supreme 
Court decisions striking down the most severe punishments available for juvenile sentencing un-
der the Eighth Amendment). 
 8 Grant, 887 F.3d at 140; see Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (finding that mandatory life sentences 
without parole for juveniles were disproportionate, and thus impermissible under the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 9 Grant, 887 F.3d at 142. 
 10 Id.; see Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (finding that mandatory life sentences without parole for 
juveniles were disproportionate, and thus impermissible under the Eighth Amendment). Incorrigi-
ble juveniles are those who are not able to be reformed. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 134 (describing the 
holding of Miller). 
 11 Grant, 887 F.3d at 145–47; see also Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1056 (10th Cir. 
2017) (finding a lack of material difference between a sentence that imprisons the defendant for 
life without parole, and one that is so long as to guarantee that the defendant will die before he is 
eligible for release); McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that, unless 
there was a significant increase in longevity, a 100-year sentence for a sixteen-year-old constituted 
de facto life without parole). 
 12 Grant, 887 F.3d at 150. 
 13 Id. at 146. 
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for a youth convicted of murder who showed capacity for reform, conclud-
ing that Miller declared unconstitutional only mandatory sentences of life 
without parole.14 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit declined to consider whether 
the defendant’s non-mandatory sentence amounted to a de facto life without 
parole sentence.15 
Part I of this Comment describes the line of Supreme Court precedent 
leading up to the Third Circuit’s decision in Grant, and summarizes the fac-
tual and procedural posture of that case.16 Part II provides an overview of 
the Third Circuit’s decision and the decisions of other circuits.17 Part III 
argues that the Third Circuit’s decision was a more natural extension of the 
Supreme Court’s precedent, whereas the Eighth Circuit did not give appro-
priate weight to the Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
and thus misapplied the Supreme Court’s precedent regarding juveniles sen-
tenced to life without parole.18 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S INCREMENTAL CONTRACTION OF ELIGIBILITY 
FOR JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE AS IT APPLIES TO GRANT 
A. Factual Background and Procedural Posture 
In 1986, at age thirteen, Corey Grant joined the E-Port Posse (“Pos-
se”), a gang that sold drugs in Elizabeth, New Jersey.19 Given his size, 
                                                                                                                           
 14 United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1018–19 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Garza v. 
Frakes, No. 8:17CV474, 2018 WL 1710183, at *4 (D. Neb. Apr. 9, 2018) (affirming a ninety-year 
sentence for crimes committed by a 16 year old). 
 15 Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1019. 
 16 See infra notes 19–70 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 71–93 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 94–120 and accompanying text. 
 19 Grant, 887 F.3d at 132. Grant reportedly came from a troubled background and had several 
run-ins with the law prior to this case. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *10–11 (describing 
Grant’s previous arrest and detention record). The E-Port Posse (“Posse”) was a drug-selling gang 
that operated in Elizabeth and parts of Newark in New Jersey. NEW JERSEY STATE COMMISSION 
OF INVESTIGATION, AFRO-LINEAL ORGANIZED CRIME 7 (1991). The Posse was created in 1987 
by brothers Bilal and Robert Pretlow, and frequently used youths to carry out their operations. See 
Joseph F. Sullivan, 21-Year-Old Stands Trial Under Drug Kingpin Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
1991 (reporting that Bilal Pretlow’s short career started in 1987, and that his gang, the E-Port 
Posse frequently used youths in their crimes). The Pretlows established themselves in the cocaine 
trafficking business by sharply cutting the cost of cocaine, and by threatening anyone who sold 
drugs in Elizabeth without being part of the Pretlows’ gang. See STATE OF NEW JERSEY COMMIS-
SION OF INVESTIGATION, supra, at 7 (describing meeting in a diner where Bilal Pretlow warned 
other drug dealers in the region to refrain from selling drugs in Elizabeth); Sullivan, supra (attrib-
uting Bilal Pretlow’s success partially to his reducing cocaine prices from $20 per vial to $10 per 
vial);. Bilal was eventually arrested on state charges and sentenced to twenty years in state prison. 
Sullivan, supra. Following this, he was indicted on capital federal charges related to the slaying of 
a teenage girl who had discovered his drug operation. See id. (describing federal charges against 
Pretlow). 
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Grant acted as one of the Posse’s “enforcers,” despite his youth.20 In August 
1989, Grant and four companions encountered Dion Lee, a former member 
of the Posse who had left the gang to deal drugs on his own.21 Grant warned 
Dion Lee not to sell drugs on the Posse’s turf unless he was working for 
them, and upon Lee’s refusal, Grant hit him on the head with a gun.22 Lee 
then attempted to withdraw from the encounter, and as he did so, Grant and 
one of his companions shot Lee in the leg.23 
Later that month, Grant and another Posse member encountered Dion’s 
brother, Mario Lee, who had also previously been warned against operating 
on the Posse’s turf.24 Lee attempted to run away from Grant and his compan-
ion, but Grant ordered his accomplice to shoot Lee to stop him from getting 
away.25 The accomplice did as he was ordered, and fatally shot Mario Lee.26 
B. Procedural Posture 
On January 25, 1991, the United States charged Grant under the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for conspiracy, 
racketeering, conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, two 
counts of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, and two counts of 
possession of a weapon in relation to a crime of violence and drug traffick-
ing.27 Despite being under eighteen at the time of his crimes, Grant was 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Grant, 887 F.3d at 135. Grant was evidently highly useful in his role as an enforcer, being 
physically large by the time he was sixteen-years-old. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 11. 
(explaining Grant’s usefulness in physical confrontations). 
 21 Grant, 887 F.3d at 136; see Brief of Appellant, Corey Grant at 10–11, 6 F.3d 780 (Table) 
(3d Cir. 1993) (No. 92-5644), 1993 WL 13121358, at *13–14 (describing Grant’s companions). 
 22 Grant, 887 F.3d at 136. 
 23 Id. Grant denies pulling the trigger himself in this encounter, despite acknowledging that he 
knew others in the group were armed. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 13. (describing the 
encounter with Dion Lee). 
 24 Grant, 887 F.3d at 136. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 135. It should be noted that under the sentencing guidelines, the punishment for solic-
iting another to commit first degree murder is equivalent to committing first degree murder one-
self, provided that the solicitation resulted in death. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 2A1.5(c)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1990). 
 27 Grant, 887 F.3d at 135. The government also presented evidence that Grant was involved 
in at least two other murders, of which he was acquitted. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 14. 
The Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was enacted in 1970 to counter-
act organized crime. Regan Gibson & Kevin Homiak, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1423, 1424 (2013). RICO’s aim was to combine varied crimes 
committed in furtherance of a criminal organization into one federal crime. See id. (describing 
RICO’s aims). To charge an individual under RICO, the individual must engage in more than one 
act of “racketeering activity.” See id. (describing the elements of a RICO offense). “Racketeering 
activity” is broadly defined and includes many state felonies. See id. at 1427 (discussing “racket-
eering activity”). In cases where the sentence for an underlying state crime is life imprisonment, 
RICO also provides for a sentence of life imprisonment. Id. at 1458 n.255. 
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tried as an adult in February 1992.28 The jury returned guilty verdicts on the 
RICO conspiracy, racketeering, drug possession, and gun possession charg-
es.29 It further found that Grant murdered Mario Lee and attempted to mur-
der Dion Lee.30 The United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey denied Grant’s departure motion and sentenced him to life without 
parole on the RICO counts.31 It also imposed a forty-year term-of-years sen-
tence on the drug-trafficking counts to run concurrently with the life sen-
tence, and a five-year sentence on the gun possession count to run consecu-
tively.32 These sentences were within obligatory sentencing guidelines.33 
The Third Circuit then affirmed the sentence and the conviction.34 Grant 
sought a writ of habeas corpus in 2006 and in 2008 filed a motion pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C § 2255.35 Both were dismissed.36 
In 2012, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, Grant filed 
a second motion under § 2255 challenging his sentence as unconstitution-
                                                                                                                           
 28 Grant, 887 F.3d at 136. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. Grant was reportedly offered multiple plea bargains by the government, ranging from 
ten-to-thirty years. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 14 (describing the government’s pur-
suit of a plea bargain with Grant and Pretlow’s attempt to pressure Grant, through his mother, to 
refuse a plea bargain). Grant declined these offers citing “loyalty and fear.” Id. 
 31 Grant, 887 F.3d at 136. Section 3553 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code permits a sentencing 
court to depart from the sentencing guidelines if the offender presents circumstances not taken into 
account by the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C § 3553(b) (2012) (describing process for imposition of 
sentence). 
 32 Grant, 887 F.3d at 136. Grant was sentenced pursuant to the 1991 Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual (“Sentencing Guidelines”). Grant v. U.S., No. 12-6844, 2014 WL 5843847, at 
*5 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2014). Section 5K2.0 of the Sentencing Guidelines allows the defendant to 
seek a departure from them in situations where the court can determine that the United States 
Sentencing Commission (“Sentencing Commission”) failed to take into account the specific cir-
cumstances of the given offender when creating the guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5K2.0 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1991). The Sentencing Guidelines later state that 
youth is ordinarily irrelevant to determining if a departure should be allowed. Grant, 2014 WL 
5843847 at *5. A term-of-years sentence is a sentence for a fixed number of years, contrasting 
with a life sentence. See McKinley, 809 F.3d at 911 (describing McKinley’s sentence). 
 33 Grant, 887 F.3d at 136. In 1990, the Sentencing Guidelines prescribed life imprisonment or 
death as the punishment for first degree murder, including when the murder was accomplished 
through solicitation of another to commit the murder. United States Sentencing Commission, 
Guidelines Manual, §§ 2 A1.1, 2A1.5 (Nov. 1990). 
 34 See Grant, 6 F.3d 780 (Table) (affirming Grant’s conviction without opinion). 
 35 Grant, 887 F.3d at 136. 
 36 Id. Habeas corpus is defined as “[a] writ employed to bring a person before a court, most 
frequently to ensure that the person’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.” Habeas Corpus, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Section 2241 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code, in rele-
vant part, allows district judges to grant writs of habeas corpus within their jurisdictions. 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 (2012), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). Section 2255 
allows a prisoner who believes that his sentence is unconstitutional, illegal, or otherwise subject to 
collateral attack to “move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the 
sentence.” Id. § 2255. 
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al.37 This challenge succeeded, and the district court ordered that Grant be 
re-sentenced.38 
For the purposes of resentencing, the district court only reviewed the 
RICO charges, for which Grant had received mandatory life sentences.39 The 
court ruled that Grant was not incorrigible, and thus, relying on Miller, over-
turned the sentence of life without parole.40 Seeking to impose a sentence that 
provided for appropriate punishment, the court sentenced Grant to sixty years 
imprisonment for the RICO charges, for a total of sixty-five years without 
parole.41 Under this resentencing Grant would be released at age seventy-two 
if he were granted good time credit, an age that Grant argued would be equiv-
alent to his life expectancy.42 Grant then appealed, and the Third Circuit ruled 
that his new sentence was still unconstitutional under Miller, holding that de-
fendants such as Grant should have a chance for release before retirement 
age.43 Following this, the en banc Third Circuit vacated the court’s initial 
opinion and judgment pending the en banc court’s decision.44 
C. Status of the Law 
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the imposition of 
cruel and unusual punishments, and affirms that punishment must be pro-
portional to the crime at hand.45 This concept of proportionality is generally 
interpreted through “evolving standards of decency” that are not stagnant, 
but rather change over time.46 In coming to its conclusions in Graham and 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Grant, 887 F.3d at 136. Section 2255 provides that a second motion “must be certified . . . 
by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain” inter alia, “a new rule of constitutional 
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In Miller v. Alabama, decided in 2012, the Court held that manda-
tory life without parole sentences for juveniles were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amend-
ment. 567 U.S. at 489. 
 38 Grant, 887 F.3d at 136; see also Grant, 2014 WL 5843847, at *6 (ordering Grant’s resen-
tencing). 
 39 Grant, 887 F.3d at 136. 
 40 Id. at 137. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. Section 3624 allows certain prisoners who follow prison rules and maintain good disci-
plinary records to receive credit towards the service of their sentence beyond the amount of days 
actually served. 18 U.S.C. § 3624. 
 43 Grant, 887 F.3d at 137, 143, 150. 
 44 Order Sur Petition for Rehearing En Banc, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 45 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Kelly Scavone, Note, How Long Is Too Long?: Conflicting 
State Responses to De Facto Life Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v. 
Alabama, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3439, 3445 (2014) (discussing origins of the Eighth Amendment 
and the narrow proportionality principle). 
 46 See Scavone, supra note 45, at 3446 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 469); see also John R. 
Mills et al., Juvenile Life Without Parole in Law and Practice: Chronicling the Rapid Change 
Underway, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 539 (2016) (discussing the Court’s application of “evolving 
standards of decency” to determine whether a punishment is proportionate). To determine whether 
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Miller, the Supreme Court merged two lines of precedent—one requiring 
individual sentencing considerations before imposing the death penalty, and 
the other striking down overly harsh sentences for offenders with dimin-
ished culpability such as juveniles and intellectually disabled persons.47 
In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that executing 
individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes 
constituted a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.48 The 
Court reasoned that, due to their diminished maturity and greater suscepti-
bility to change, minors have lessened culpability as compared to adults.49 
The Court further held that both of the two legitimate penological justifica-
tions for the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, apply to minors with 
lesser force than adults.50 In light of that realization and the principle that 
                                                                                                                           
a punishment comports with the “evolving standards of decency,” the court ascertains whether a 
national consensus exists against a punishment. Mills et al., supra, at 539. If such a consensus 
does exist, the court exercises its own judgment to assess the proportionality of a punishment. Id. 
 47 See Scavone, supra note 45, at 3446–47. The Court had previously found that the death 
penalty was inappropriate for offenders with diminished culpability, such as those with intellectual 
disabilities. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 470 (noting that the court has previously overturned sentencing 
practices in cases where the severity of sentences did not account for diminished culpability of 
offenders). Prior to this, the Court had also overturned mandatory death sentences. Id. Although in 
2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court did not provide a substantive definition of intellec-
tual disability, instead leaving the issue to the states, it did utilize the definition provided in the 
American Association of Mental Retardation for guidance. Natalie Cheung, Note, Defining Intel-
lectual Disability and Establishing a Standard of Proof: Suggestions for a National Model Stand-
ard, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 317, 319 (2013) (describing Atkins’ standards for mental disability); see 
also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (tasking the states with determining an appro-
priate constitutional test). The American Association on Intellectual and Development Disabilities, 
currently defines “intellectual disability” as “characterized by significant limitations both in intel-
lectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adap-
tive skills . . . originat[ing] before the age of 18.” Cheung, supra, at 322. In 2010, in Graham v. 
Florida, a case that preceded Miller, the Supreme Court drew a comparison between the death 
penalty and life in prison without parole. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010) (drawing 
similarities between death and life without parole). 
 48 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). In 2005 the United States was the only coun-
try that officially retained the death penalty for juvenile offenders. Id. at 575. 
 49 Id. at 569–70. The Court drew special attention to the fact that minors are more impression-
able than adults, and more likely to succumb to peer pressure and other outside influences. Id. 
 50 Id. at 571. The Court has held that, generally, punishments should be underpinned by a 
legitimate penological justification. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182–83 (1976) (noting 
that punishments must be at least somewhat justified by legitimate penological purposes). The 
Court often refers to four such justifications: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilita-
tion. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (describing examples of possible theories of 
penological justification). Retribution is the theory that punishment is justified because criminals 
deserve punishment. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF SENTENCING § 2:5 (3d ed., 2018) 
(discussing retributive theory). Deterrence seeks to prevent further commission of crimes. See id. 
§ 2.2 (discussing deterrent rationale). Incapacitation refers to the physical prevention of the ability 
of the punished individual to commit further crimes. See id. § 2.3 (discussing incapacitation ra-
tionale). Finally, rehabilitation refers to the goal of preventing crime by reforming the criminal. 
See id. § 2.4 (discussing rehabilitative rationale). The Court has previously noted that only two 
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the death penalty is reserved for those offenders who are the most culpable, 
the Court held that the death penalty is inappropriate for juvenile offenders.51 
Five years later, in 2010, the Court held in Graham that the Eighth 
Amendment bars sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole for 
non-homicide offenses.52 The Court reasoned that, as it had previously 
found juveniles are less culpable than adults, and because defendants who 
do not kill are less culpable than murderers, juveniles who do not commit 
homicide have an even further diminished culpability.53 The Court also stat-
ed that life without parole sentences share many characteristics with death 
sentences, denying defendants the hope that they will ever leave prison.54 In 
addition, the Court held that, similar to death sentences, life without parole 
sentences for juveniles are unsupported by the legitimate penological justi-
fications of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.55 The 
Court then noted that a national consensus had developed against the prac-
tice of sentencing juveniles to life without parole.56 Accordingly, reasoning 
that juveniles should not lose the opportunity for personal emotional 
growth, the Court categorically held that life without parole sentences were 
unconstitutional for juvenile non-homicide offenders.57 
                                                                                                                           
legitimate penological objectives are applicable to the death penalty—retribution and deterrence. 
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (describing social purposes of the death penalty). 
 51 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 52 Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; see also Krisztina Schlessel, Note, Graham’s Applicability to 
Term-of-Years Sentences and Mandate to Provide a “Meaningful Opportunity” for Release, 40 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1027, 1034 (2013) (describing Graham and Roper’s reasoning for the deter-
mination that children are different from adults for constitutional purposes). Schlessel demon-
strates that, even prior to the Court’s subsequent decision in Miller, it was already recognized that 
exceedingly long term-of-years sentences post Graham presented constitutional conundrums. See 
Schlessel, supra, at 1038 (describing the diverging responses of courts throughout the country to 
lengthy term-of-years sentences post Graham); see also Mark T. Freeman, Comment, Meaningless 
Opportunities: Graham v. Florida and the Reality of De Facto LWOP Sentences, 44 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 961, 963 (2013) (arguing that de facto life without parole sentences will be held unconstitu-
tional under the eighth amendment following Graham). 
 53 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (stating that juvenile non-homicide offenders have doubly 
reduced moral culpability, especially when compared to adult homicide offenders). 
 54 Id. Compare id. (noting the similarities between the death penalty and life without parole), 
with Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming Wave of Eighth 
Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 37 (2012) (disputing the similarity between the 
death penalty and all other punishments). 
 55 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. The Court in Graham opined that the lessened culpability of juve-
nile non-homicide offenders causes retribution to be insufficient to justify such a sentence. Id. at 
71. Further, the diminished capacities of juveniles cause them to be less susceptible to deterrence. 
Id. at 72. Incapacitation is also insufficient to justify life without parole for juveniles as it requires 
a determination of the juvenile’s incorrigibility and “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.” Id. 
at 73. Finally, the sentence of life without parole, similarly to the death penalty, entirely abandons 
rehabilitation as a penological goal. Id. at 74. 
 56 Id. at 67. 
 57 Id. at 79, 82. 
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In 2012, in Miller, although refusing to proclaim a categorical rule, the 
Court found that sentencing schemes that included mandatory life without 
parole for juvenile homicide offenders also violated the Eighth Amend-
ment.58 The Court interpreted Graham to insist that “youth matters” in de-
termining the appropriateness of life without parole.59 Accordingly, the Court 
held that mandatory life without parole prevents a sentencing court from tak-
ing a juvenile defendant’s youth into account when considering sentencing, 
and goes against Graham’s central principle that, due to their unique charac-
teristics, children are less culpable and must be treated differently from 
adults.60 In addition, relying on its holding in Graham that life sentences for 
juveniles are, in many ways, analogous to the death penalty, the Court applied 
the series of cases that required individualized sentencing for death penalty 
defendants to mandatory life without parole for all juveniles, including homi-
cide offenders.61 It held that, for constitutional purposes, children are differ-
ent from adults in much the same way as the death penalty is different from 
all other punishments.62 In doing so, the Court noted that mandatory life 
without parole schemes, by their nature, preclude a sentence from taking 
account of an offender’s age, and thus are more likely to result in a dispro-
portionate punishment.63 Although refusing to outright bar life without pa-
role for juvenile defendants, the Court stated that after Miller, life without 
parole should be uncommon for juvenile offenders, and required sentencing 
courts to account for the differences between adults and children.64 
Next, in 2016, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court held inter alia 
that Miller announced a rule of substantive law that applied retroactively.65 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. 
 59 Id. at 483 
 60 Id. at 474. The Graham Court noted that psychological studies had shown significant dif-
ferences between the functioning of juvenile and adult brains. 560 U.S. at 68. It pointed out that 
juveniles are more likely to change than are adults and are therefore unlikely to be irreparably 
corrupt. Id. Finally, the court pointed out that the differences between children and adults, namely 
the greater impulsiveness of children, their diminished understanding of long-term consequences, 
and their mistrust of adults, presented unique challenges in their representation. Id. at 78. 
 61 Miller, 567 U.S. at 470; see Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70 (describing similarities between 
sentences of death and life without parole). 
 62 Miller, 567 U.S. at 481. The court stated that “if . . . ‘death is different,’ children are differ-
ent too.” Id. 
 63 See id. at 479 (noting that if youth is not relevant to a sentencing scheme, the risk of pun-
ishment that is disproportionate becomes too serious). 
 64 Id. at 480. See generally Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and Juveniles: Eighth 
Amendment Limits and Sixth Amendment Rights, 56 B.C. L. REV. 553, 580 (2015) (discussing 
whether a jury finding of incorrigibility might be necessary for a sentence of life without parole 
under Miller). 
 65 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (holding that because Miller 
caused life without parole to be unconstitutional for a whole class of people, it announced a sub-
stantive rule of constitutional law, thus was retroactive). Inter alia typically means “[a]mong other 
things.” Inter Alia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Prior to this decision, state courts 
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The Court further ruled that following Miller, non-incorrigible juvenile of-
fenders constitute a class for whom life without parole is a disproportionate 
and therefore unconstitutional punishment under the Eighth Amendment.66 
Finally, on March 18, 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Mathena v. Malvo.67 Mathena is an appeal from a Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision that held, inter alia, that Montgomery’s holding requires a 
determination of incorrigibility before a life without parole sentence could 
be imposed on a juvenile offender.68 In that case, the Fourth Circuit held 
that Montgomery’s ruling that Miller is violated whenever a life without 
parole sentence is imposed on a non-incorrigible juvenile was fundamental 
to the holding, and accordingly not dicta.69 In granting certiorari, the Su-
preme Court will likely be called upon to confirm whether the Fourth Cir-
cuit properly interpreted Montgomery, or whether the holding of Miller ap-
plies only to mandatory sentences of life without parole.70 
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT HOLDS DE FACTO LIFE WITHOUT  
PAROLE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
State courts and legislatures have reacted in several ways to effectuate 
the Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in Miller v. Alabama.71 Congress, howev-
er, has yet to enact any legislation doing so, and, accordingly, the matter has 
                                                                                                                           
were split on the retroactivity of Miller, with fourteen state supreme courts ruling that it applied ret-
roactively, while another seven ruled that it did not. See Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: 
An Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 1, 3 (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/
publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/CLH5-L7R3] (describing differences 
in state court holdings regarding the retroactivity of Miller). 
 66 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. Montgomery’s holding resulted in the nearly 2,100 juve-
niles across the United States serving mandatory sentences of life without parole receiving the 
ability to challenge their sentences as unconstitutional. See Rovner, supra note 65, at 3 (noting 
number of juveniles whose sentences are unconstitutional). 
 67 Mathena v. Malvo, No. 18-217, 2019 WL 1231751 (U.S. 2019). 
 68 Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265, 275 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 69 See id. at 284 (dismissing petitioner’s argument that Montgomery’s statement on unconsti-
tutionality of life without parole for non-incorrigible juveniles was dicta). 
 70 See id. (finding that the Montgomery interpretation of the Miller rule was not dicta). 
 71 United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 142, reh’g en banc granted, vacated, 905 F.3d 285 
(3d Cir. 2018); see, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 122 (Iowa 2013) (finding that defend-
ant’s sentence, commuted by the governor to sixty years without parole, was the functional equiv-
alent of a mandatory LWOP sentence and therefore unconstitutional); People v. Caballero, 282 
P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (finding that a term of years sentence of 110 years for a juvenile con-
victed of a non-homicide offense was unconstitutional); see also Mills et al., supra note 46, at 554 
(showing various forms of state abolition of juvenile life without parole sentences following Mil-
ler v. Alabama). Many states have simply abolished the possibility of sentencing juveniles to life 
without parole, whereas some others have added parole eligibility to all life sentences for juve-
niles. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 141–42 (describing state legislative responses). 
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fallen to the circuit courts.72 In 2018, in United States v. Grant, therefore, 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was required to determine whether sen-
tences for non-incorrigible juveniles, which amount to de facto life without 
parole, are unconstitutional following Miller.73 
In its initial opinion in Grant, the Third Circuit held that a term-of-
years sentence that was longer than a non-incorrigible juvenile’s expected 
lifespan was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.74 In reaching 
this holding, the court noted three distinct reasons.75 First, Miller categori-
cally allowed life without parole sentences only for incorrigible juvenile 
homicide offenders.76 Second, the penological justifications barring actual 
life without parole sentences for most juveniles apply with equal force to de 
facto life without parole sentences.77 Finally, it opined that de facto life 
without parole is irreconcilable with Miller’s holding that non-incorrigible 
juveniles must be afforded a legitimate chance of being released from pris-
on.78 The court noted that Miller’s holding was partially premised on the 
fact that sentences of death and life without parole are in many ways simi-
lar, and not on the formal designation of the sentence.79 Rather than specify-
ing a distinct approach for measuring a defendant’s life expectancy, the 
court held that, prior to imposing a term of years sentence that runs the risk 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Grant, 887 F.3d at 142. The federal system abolished parole as of 1984, effectively equat-
ing all life sentences with life without parole sentences. See id. (noting congressional abolition of 
federal parole); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(5), 98 
Stat. 1837, 2027 (repealing 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201–4218). 
 73 Grant, 887 F.3d at 142. De facto life without parole sentences are those sentences that meet 
or exceed the defendant’s life expectancy. See id. at 145 (discussing other courts’ treatment of de 
facto life sentences for juveniles). Such sentences are also known as “virtual life without parole.” 
See Scavone, supra note 45, at 3442 (describing de facto or virtual life without parole sentences). 
 74 Grant, 887 F.3d at 142. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 143. In the instant case, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
had previously ruled that Grant was not incorrigible, and this was not challenged on appeal. Grant, 
887 F.3d at 137. In 2012, in Miller, the Supreme Court noted, that in light of the Court’s reasoning 
and decisions in both Roper v. Simmons in 2005 and Graham v. Florida in 2010, situations that 
allowed for the imposition of life without parole on juveniles would be rare. Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). 
 77 Grant, 887 F.3d at 143. Specifically, the court noted that without adequate penological 
justifications, a sentence cannot be proportionate under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 144. As the 
analysis that juveniles are inherently both less receptive to deterrence, and less culpable than are 
adults underpins the court’s disavowal of mandatory life without parole sentences, logically this 
same reasoning must apply to de facto life without parole sentences. See id. at 138 (discussing 
penological justifications for life without parole and de facto life without parole). 
 78 Id. at 140 (finding that juveniles must be given a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”). 
 79 Id. at 143. The court noted that both the comparison between life without parole and the 
death penalty, and the fact that spending one’s life behind bars is an especially severe sentence, 
hold true regardless of whether a sentence is officially labeled as life without parole or as a 
lengthy term of years’ sentence. Id. 
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of meeting or exceeding the defendant’s mortality, the court must conduct 
an evidentiary hearing in order to ascertain the defendant’s expected life 
span.80 
The court then proceeded to discuss how to effectuate Miller and Gra-
ham v. Florida’s mandate of a “meaningful opportunity for release,” opin-
ing that a non-incorrigible juvenile offenders must be afforded an oppor-
tunity for release early enough in their lives that they may still achieve per-
sonal growth and re-enter society.81 The court recognized the difficulty of 
determining a constitutionally acceptable age at which a non-incorrigible 
juvenile must be afforded a meaningful opportunity for release, noting in 
particular that relying on actuarial tables or life expectancy data created 
possible constitutional issues.82 Accordingly, the court avoided these issues 
and held that in order to be constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, 
there is a rebuttable presumption that a non-incorrigible juvenile must be 
afforded a meaningful opportunity for release before the age of retirement.83 
Following Grant, the Third Circuit voted to allow the government’s 
petition for rehearing en banc, and in doing so, vacated the initial opinion 
and judgment.84 After the rehearing, the en banc court issued an order holding 
the appeal pending the Supreme Court’s judgment in Mathena v. Malvo.85  
Other courts have considered the issue of de facto life without parole 
sentences for juveniles.86 The Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. at 149. 
 81 Id. at 147. The court noted that its expansive view meant that such a meaningful opportuni-
ty must be more than the chance to leave prison right before one dies. Id. It opined that a juvenile 
must presumptively be offered a chance for “fulfillment outside prison walls,” “reconciliation with 
society,” “hope,” and “the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of 
human worth and potential.” Id. 
 82 Id. at 149. Specifically, the court noted that life expectancy tables rely on characteristics 
such as race, gender, and income to determine the life expectancy of any given individual. Id. 
Therefore, were the court to rely solely on these tools, it could result, for instance, in wealthier 
defendants who have a greater life expectancy than poorer defendants, receiving longer sentences 
as a result. See id. (discussing possible sentencing disparities between defendants with different 
life expectancies based on factors such as race, education, and socio-economic class). 
 83 Id. at 150. To reach the conclusion that a juvenile offender should be afforded a meaningful 
opportunity for release before the age of retirement, the court considered a number of factors. Id. 
It noted that there are no studies that assisted the court in setting the age at which an offender must 
be afforded such an opportunity. Id. However, utilizing the traditional understanding of retirement 
as a time in one’s life at which one is determined to have contributed to society sufficiently that it 
becomes acceptable to leave the workforce, the court determined that release before this age 
would be appropriate as it would allow the offender to contribute to society. Id. The court also 
noted that this approach addresses the Supreme Court’s concern in Graham that juveniles sen-
tenced to life without parole are often denied vocational opportunities while serving their sentenc-
es. Id. at 151. 
 84 Order Sur Petition for Rehearing En Banc, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 85 Order, USA v. Grant, No. 16-3820 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 86 See Grant, 887 F.3d at 145–47 (documenting federal appellate court response to de facto 
life without parole sentences); see also, e.g., Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1059–60 (10th 
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Appeals have reached similar conclusions as the Third Circuit and have 
ruled that de facto life without parole sentences pose the same constitutional 
problems as actual life without parole sentences.87 Those courts relied 
mainly on the reasoning that the justifications upon which Graham and Mil-
ler are based apply with equal force to both de facto and de jure life without 
parole sentences.88 In addition, these courts noted that the rules promulgated 
under Graham and Miller did not depend on the linguistic label of a sen-
tence under state law to reach their holdings, but instead, on the distinct dif-
ference in the severity of life without parole and all other lesser sentences.89 
These courts did not issue guidance for when juvenile offenders must be giv-
en a meaningful opportunity for release, but merely stated that it was uncon-
stitutional for them to be in prison beyond their natural life expectancy.90 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, refused to promulgate a sim-
ilar rule.91 The court reasoned in 2016 in United States v. Jefferson that Mil-
ler did not establish a categorical rule against life sentences for juveniles 
                                                                                                                           
Cir. 2017) (holding that 155-year sentence for juvenile convicted of non-homicide offense violat-
ed categorical rule proclaimed in Graham); United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th 
Cir. 2016) (finding that 600 month sentence for juvenile homicide offender was not mandatory 
and therefore was constitutional); McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding 
that juvenile murderer’s sentence of two consecutive fifty-year terms was unconstitutional without 
consideration of youth); Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that 254-
year sentence that would have allowed for parole after 127 years and two months for juvenile 
convicted of non-homicide crimes was unconstitutional). 
 87 See Grant, 887 F.3d at 145–47 (discussing circuit courts’ holdings); see also Budder, 851 
F.3d at 1059–60 (holding that 155-year sentence for juvenile convicted of non-homicide offense 
violated categorical rule proclaimed in Graham); Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1019 (finding that 600 
month sentence for juvenile homicide offender was not mandatory and therefore was constitution-
al); McKinley, 809 F.3d at 914 (holding that without consideration of characteristics of youth, 
juvenile murderer’s sentence of two consecutive fifty-year terms was unconstitutional); Moore, 
725 F.3d at 1194 (holding that 254-year sentence that would have allowed for parole after 127 
years and two months for juvenile convicted of non-homicide crimes was unconstitutional). 
 88 Grant, 887 F.3d at 146; see also Budder, 1041 F.3d at 1056 (holding that there was no 
difference between a term of years sentence that would imprison a defendant for the rest of his life 
and a sentence formally designated as life without parole) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 113 
n.11); McKinley, 809 F.3d at 911 (noting that the logic of Miller applies to term-of-years sentence 
because the sentence is too long for the defendant to possibly survive beyond it). 
 89 Grant, 887 F.3d at 143–44; see also Moore, 725 F.3d at 1191–92 (holding that, as Moore 
will not be able to seek parole before his death, there is no difference between his sentence of 254 
years, and a sentence of life without parole). 
 90 See, e.g., Budder, 851 F.3d at 1059 (holding that a sentence that would require the defend-
ant to serve 131.75 years before parole eligibility violated the Eighth Amendment following the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Graham); McKinley, 809 F.3d at 911 (finding Miller applicable to 
juvenile sentenced to two consecutive fifty-year terms). 
 91 Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1019. This case involved a youth who had committed numerous 
crimes before the age of eighteen, including the fire-bombing murder of five innocent children. Id. 
at 1017. He was sentenced to life without parole in 1998 but re-sentenced pursuant to Miller, to 
600 months in prison. Id. at 1017–18. At resentencing, the district court held that Jefferson was 
not incorrigible, and that his rehabilitation had been an “extraordinary success.” Id. at 1020. 
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convicted of homicide offences, and pronounced a ban only on mandatory 
life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide, purposely 
leaving discretionary life sentences untouched.92 As an individualized sen-
tencing hearing had been conducted, the court concluded that it did not need 
to reach the issue of de facto life sentences following Miller.93 
III. MONTGOMERY’S INFLUENCE: MORE THAN JUST RETROACTIVITY 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Miller v. Ala-
bama in 2018 in United States v. Grant should be affirmed by the en banc 
court because it is a natural extension of Supreme Court precedent as it ap-
plies to lengthy term-of-years sentences for juveniles that exceed their natural 
life expectancy, with special attention paid to the spirit of the Supreme 
Court’s holdings.94 In addition, the articulated framework focusing on the age 
of retirement provides a novel and effective way to effectuate the Court’s 
mandate that a non-incorrigible juvenile defendant should be given a mean-
ingful opportunity for release and possible re-entry into society.95 
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court should affirm the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals’ 2018 decision in Malvo v. Mathena.96 As the Fourth 
Circuit properly recognized, the Supreme Court’s 2016 finding in Mont-
gomery v. Louisiana that Miller declared the unconstitutionality of life 
without parole for non-incorrigible juveniles was indispensable to its hold-
ing that Miller was to be applied retroactively.97 This is because, although 
substantive rules of constitutional law apply retroactively to final judg-
                                                                                                                           
 92 See id. at 1018–19 (refusing to consider petitioner’s theory that his sentence constituted de 
facto life without parole due to his sentence being discretionary). 
 93 Id. at 1019. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the resentencing court had ap-
propriately applied the Supreme Court’s precedent that “children are constitutionally different.” 
Id. 
 94 See generally Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (holding that Miller v. 
Alabama made life without parole unconstitutional for most juveniles); Miller v. Alabama, 567 
U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (holding that life without parole for juveniles would be rare in light of 
the Court’s opinion); United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, vacat-
ed, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that de facto life without parole sentences are inappro-
priate for non-incorrigible juveniles). 
 95 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010) (requiring that juvenile offenders not con-
victed of homicide be afforded a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation”); Grant, 887 F.3d at 147 (determining the necessary aspects of a 
“meaningful opportunity for release”). 
 96 See Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265, 274 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding that Miller could apply 
to both discretionary and mandatory sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders). 
 97 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (holding that Miller caused life without parole to be 
unconstitutional for “a class of defendants because of their status,” namely, non-incorrigible juve-
nile defendants); Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (holding that following the ruling, sentences of life with-
out parole for juveniles would be rare because of the difficulty of finding juveniles to be incorrigi-
ble). 
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ments, mere constitutional rules of criminal procedure do not.98 The Court 
has held that substantive rules include those that invalidate a type of pun-
ishment for a specific category of offenders.99 If Miller’s holding was lim-
ited to only proscribing mandatory life without parole sentences for juve-
niles, then Miller would have announced only a procedural rule, which 
would not have had retroactive effect.100 Accordingly, the Court’s language 
in Montgomery recognizing the unconstitutionality of life without parole 
sentences for non-incorrigible juveniles cannot have been dicta.101 
It follows then, that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ interpretation 
of the Supreme Court’s precedents in Graham v. Florida, Miller, and Mont-
gomery did not accord sufficient weight to the district court’s judgment that 
the defendant in United States v. Jefferson was not incorrigible.102 The 
Eighth Circuit premised its decision on the fact that the sentencing court 
had not imposed a mandatory life without parole sentence, and had amply 
taken account of the defendant’s youth when prescribing a sentence.103 The 
substantive rule announced in Montgomery, however, specifically noted that 
merely taking youth into account is not enough.104 Instead, Montgomery 
made clear that life without parole is unconstitutional for the entire class of 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728 (noting that though rules of criminal procedure do not 
apply retroactively to final convictions, substantive rules of constitutional law do). 
 99 See id. (holding that rules that proscribe a punishment for a “class of defendants because of 
their status or offense” are substantive rules of constitutional law); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
302, 329–30 (1989) (describing situations in which new constitutional rules are to have retroactive 
effect), overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 100 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728 (noting that procedural rules are not applied retroac-
tively). 
 101 See id. (holding that only substantive rules of constitutional law apply retroactively); Mal-
vo, 893 F.3d at 274 (holding that Montgomery’s statement regarding the application of Miller was 
not dicta); see also Erin Dunn, Comment, Montgomery v. Louisiana: An Attempt to Make Juvenile 
Life Without Parole a Practical Impossibility, 32 TOURO L. REV. 679, 693–94 (2016) (noting that 
the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the Miller rule in Montgomery v. Louisiana caused 
Miller to be applicable retroactively). 
 102 See United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1018–19 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that, as 
Miller did not categorically prohibit imposing life without parole on juvenile offenders, the court 
did not need to consider whether Miller applied to defendant’s de facto life sentence). In 2015, in 
United States v. Jefferson, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota found that 
the defendant’s conduct during his prison term went against a sentence of life without parole. No. 
CRIM 97-256 04 MJD, 2015 WL 501968, at *8 (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2015), aff’d, 816 F.3d 1016. 
 103 See Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1019–21 (holding that the district court appropriately considered 
the defendant’s youth when determining his sentence). 
 104 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (stating that a sentence of life without parole is unconstitu-
tional for children whose crimes reflect “transient immaturity,” even if an individualized sentenc-
ing process is conducted); see also Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: 
State Responses, the Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban on Life 
Without Parole for Juveniles Is the Only Constitutional Option, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149, 179 
(2017) (arguing that Montgomery made clear that Miller imposed a categorical bar on life without 
parole for non-incorrigible juveniles). 
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non-incorrigible juvenile defendants.105 In Jefferson, the court had already 
concluded that the defendant was not incorrigible.106 Accordingly, under 
Miller and Montgomery, the option to impose a sentence of life without pa-
role was unavailable to the resentencing court.107 Therefore, the Eighth Cir-
cuit should have evaluated Jefferson’s contention that his sentence amount-
ed to de facto life without parole on its own merits.108 
In its initial opinion, the Third Circuit, along with the Seventh, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals appropriately applied this standard to 
its case.109 As the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
had previously determined that the defendant in Grant was not incorrigible, 
the court properly evaluated whether his lengthy term of years sentence 
contravened Miller.110 Miller and Graham’s mandates do not focus on the 
terminology underpinning the sentences that they overturned.111 Instead the 
focus is on concepts such as the denial of hope as a result of a life without 
parole sentence, the inability of a juvenile sentenced to life without parole to 
ever re-enter society and achieve personal fulfillment, and the near-guarantee 
that one sentenced to life without parole will die in prison.112 A lengthy term 
of years sentence that exceeds the natural lifespan of a defendant and dooms 
them to die in prison violates the same constitutional principles as a true life 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (finding that Miller “rendered life without parole an uncon-
stitutional penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their status’—that is, juvenile offenders 
whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth”); see Brandon Buskey, Reaction to Mont-
gomery v. Louisiana: The Supreme Court Offers Hope to Juveniles Sentenced to Die in Prison, 
and a Little to Adults as Well, 41 HARBINGER 175, 176 (2016) (discussing the alterations that 
Mongtomery made to the Court’s original holding in Miller, specifically that, following Montgom-
ery, Miller applied to more than just mandatory sentences of life without parole”). 
 106 See Jefferson, 2015 WL 501968, at *9 (finding that Jefferson has experienced “extraordi-
nary success” in prison treatment programs). 
 107 See id. (finding that Jefferson could be rehabilitated and thus did not deserve life in pris-
on); see also Dunn, supra note 101 at 704 (arguing that, in Montgomery, the majority rewrote the 
holding of Miller, requiring courts to determine whether a juvenile is incorrigible, rather than 
merely taking into account the juvenile’s youth). 
 108 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (holding life without parole unconstitutional for non-
incorrigible juvenile offenders); Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1019 (declining to consider Jefferson’s 
contention that he was sentenced to de facto life without parole). 
 109 See Grant, 887 F.3d at 135 (noting that the court must afford special attention to the dis-
tinction between incorrigible juvenile offenders and others); see also Hoesterey, supra note 104, at 
179 (arguing that the holdings of Miller and Montgomery apply to both de facto and de jure sen-
tences of life without parole). 
 110 See Grant, 887 F.3d at 143–46 (discussing application of Supreme Court precedents to 
juvenile offenders that are capable of reform). 
 111 See id. at 145–46 (noting that courts in other circuits agreed that Miller and Graham were 
premised on more than the linguistic label of life without parole). 
 112 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 70 (noting that, like death sentences, life without parole sentenc-
es deprive the offender of any chance of rejoining society or reaching personal fulfillment). 
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without parole sentence does.113 Accordingly, the court correctly interpreted 
such a sentence to be unconstitutional following Miller and Graham.114 
Finally, the broad approach of the initial opinion of the Third Circuit to 
effectuating the Supreme Court’s mandate of a meaningful opportunity for 
release properly considers the spirit and intent behind the Court’s opinions 
in Graham and Miller.115 In paying special attention to the Court’s language 
in Graham, the Third Circuit’s initial opinion departs from a purely me-
chanical understanding of that case’s categorical rule.116 Graham’s concern 
with the limitations of a life without parole sentence, combined with its fo-
cus on a defendant’s ability to achieve self-fulfillment clearly demonstrates 
an intent that non-incorrigible juveniles have an opportunity to participate 
in society beyond living out the last few years of their lives following re-
lease.117 The court’s focus on age of retirement affords a means of consist-
ently realizing this mandate, while avoiding arbitrary line drawing as well 
as the possible constitutional implications of relying on life expectancy da-
ta.118 In addition, as the court adopted only a rebuttable presumption, this 
standard still allows a sentencing court considerable discretion to alter sen-
                                                                                                                           
 113 See Grant, 887 F.3d at 143–44 (concluding that, as with life without parole sentences, a de 
facto life without parole sentence for a non-incorrigible juvenile offender cannot be justified by 
legitimate penological objectives). A juvenile offender sentenced to such a long term must spend 
the rest of his or her natural life in prison and will likely die in prison just as one who is sentenced 
to life without parole. See Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1050 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that 
juvenile homicide offender who was sixteen-years-old at the time of his crime would have been 
required to serve at least 131.75 years before the possibility of release). 
 114 See Grant, 887 F.3d at 145 (holding that there is no meaningful opportunity for release 
when serving a de facto life without parole sentence). 
 115 See id. at 148 (adopting a broader standard for “meaningful opportunity for release”). 
 116 See id. at 150 (holding that, to realize Graham’s mandate of “a meaningful opportunity for 
release,” one must be afforded “‘hope’ and a chance for ‘fulfillment outside prison walls,’ ‘recon-
ciliation with society,’ and ‘the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition 
of human worth and potential’” (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 79)); see also Hoesterey, supra note 
104, at 179 (arguing that the difference in the terminology of a term-of-years sentence should not 
hold Miller and Montgomery’s holdings inapplicable). 
 117 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 (noting that, in many prisons, inmates serving life without 
parole sentences are often excluded from rehabilitative programs such as treatment and vocational 
opportunities, exacerbating the disproportionality of the sentence for youths); Grant, 887 F.3d at 
147 (noting that Graham conveyed that the Supreme Court’s intention was that juvenile offenders 
receive more than physical release from prison just before death). 
 118 See Grant, 887 F.3d at 150 (noting the difficulty of determining the age at which one can still 
meaningfully reenter society). See generally Adele Cummings & Stacie Nelson Colling, There Is No 
Meaningful Opportunity in Meaningless Data: Why It Is Unconstitutional to Use Life Expectancy 
Tables in Post-Graham Sentences, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 267, 272 (2014) (discussing the 
constitutional deficiencies of using life expectancy tables to determine appropriate sentences). 
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tences as needed, given extraordinary circumstances.119 Accordingly, the 
Third Circuit’s initial opinion should be affirmed by the en banc court.120 
CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit’s initial opinion in United States v. Grant correctly 
applied Supreme Court precedent announced in Graham, Miller, and Mont-
gomery to hold that term of years sentences exceeding natural life expec-
tancy for non-incorrigible juveniles are unconstitutional. The court properly 
effectuated those rulings and provided a clear framework for lower courts to 
follow by creating a rebuttable presumption that non-incorrigible offenders 
who committed their crimes as juveniles should be afforded a meaningful 
opportunity for release before the age of retirement. Meanwhile, the Eighth 
Circuit did not give enough weight to the Supreme Court’s statement in 
Montgomery that made clear that Miller created a rule of substantive law, 
holding sentences of life without parole unconstitutional for all non-
incorrigible juveniles. The Supreme Court should affirm the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Mathena, and definitively clarify that Montgomery and 
Miller require a determination of incorrigibility before a life without parole 
sentence can be imposed on a juvenile offender. If the Court does so, Jeffer-
son should be overruled, and the Third Circuit en banc should affirm the 
Third Circuit’s initial opinion in Grant. 
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